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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RICHFIELD CARE CENTER and UTAH
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiff-Appellants,
-vCase No. 20412
LYDIA J. TORGERSON and UTAH
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
Defendant-Respondents•

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
UTAH STATE INSURANCE FUND

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues to be decided on this appeal are:
1.

Whether the Utah State Industrial Commission abused its

discretion in ordering the employer to pay for an injury to the
worker's compensation applicant which occurred on January 20, 1982
without a finding that the applicant suffered an accident in the
course of employment.
2.

Whether the Utah State Industrial Commission properly

allocated responsibility for temporary total compensation and
medical benefits between the employer and the Second Injury Fund.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a Petition for Review of an Order of the Utah State
Industrial Commission awarding compensation and medical benefits
to Ms. Torgerson for back injuries which occurred on July 6, 1980
and

January

20,

1982,

and

requiring the Second

Injury Fund to

reimburse the employer for only one-third of the temporary total
compensation and medical benefits it paid.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ms, Torgerson began her employment at: Richfield Care
Center in July of 1979 and continued with the same duties thereafter.

Those duties included responsibility for dressing patients

and getting them ready for their daily routine (R. 21).
On July 6, 1980, she was sitting a patient in a chair, lost
her balance and was forced against the wall, striking her back
(R. 41-42, 58-59).

She describes no additional back pain after a

subsequent hysterectomy and bladder repair she underwent in July
of 1980 (R. 33-35) .
At the hearing in this case, Ms. Torgerson described an
incident which took place on January 20, 1982.

She reached to

pull a T-shirt down over the shoulders of a patient who was
sitting up in bed when she experienced a pain in her back (R. 2124, 58-59).
After the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge, in Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated May 4, 1983, made the
following Findings:
The 1980 incident was clearly an industrial
accident, but no claim was made by the
applicant for that incident. The only event
for which a claim is being made is for an
incident that occurred on January 20, 1982
(R. 134).
The Administrative Law Judge went on to find:
There was nothing unusual about the activities
on the morning of January 20, 1982 nor was

there any unusual strain, twisting, fall, bump
or even an unusual movement.
In the this (sic) case there was no unusual
exertion nor anything unusual about the
activities of the applicant. There was no
unanticipated, unintended occurrence different
from what would normally be expected to occur
and there was no unforeseen or unexpected
event to precipitate the symptoms complained
of by the applicant (R. 135) (See Attachment
A).
The Administrative Law Judge, relying on Sabo's Electronic Service
v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 774 (Utah 1982), determined that the incident
described on January 20, 1982 did not constitute an injury by
accident (R. 135).
On January 3, 1984, the applicant's attorney filed a Motion
for Review or Supplemental Order requesting that the Commission
reconsider the Findings of the Administrative Law Judge as to the
incident of January 20, 1982, and also allow for amendment of the
application to include a claim on the July 6, 1980 incident
(R. 143-145) .

While that Motion was untimely, the Commission,

through the Administrative Law Judge, ordered the case reopened
because notice had not been received by the applicant's attorney
of the prior Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 147-148,
152-154) (see Attachment B ) .
The case was referred

to an independent medical panel

consisting of Dr. Frank Dituri and Dr. Mark Greene.

They found

that Ms. Torgerson suffered a 2.5% impairment of the whole body
attributable to the July 6, 1980 industrial accident, a 2.5% whole
body impairment attributable to conditions existing prior to July
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6, 1980, and a 2.5% impairment attributable to the incident of
January 20, 1982 (R. 164-166)•
The Administrative Law Judge then entered Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on October 3, 1984 which allowed for
amendment of the application for hearing to include the July 6,
1980 incident which the Administrative Law Judge found to be an
accident in the course of employment.

The Administrative Law

Judge further concluded:
Though the Administrative Law Judge found the
1982 incident did not amount to an accident
for which benefits could be recovered in the
first order, we now find that the applicant is
entitled to benefits as a result of the 1982
incident inasmuch as it was an incident v/hich
aggravated a previous industrial injury with
the same employer.
The Administrative Law Judge further concluded that:
The defendant employer and the State Insurance
Fund are entitled to reimbursement from the
Second Injury Fund for payments of temporary
total disability and medical expenses based on
ratio of 2.5 over 7.5, or 33% (R. 178) (see
Attachment C ) .
A Motion for Review was filed by the Utah State Insurance Fund on
the 18th of October, 1984 (R. 181-185) (see Attachment D ) . The
Industrial Commission of Utah denied the Motion for Review on
December

13, 1984 without additional findings

(R. 186) (see

Attachment E ) .
A Petition for Review and Docketing Statement were filed with
this Court requesting a review of the Industrial Commission's
Order on January 7, 1985 (R. 188-192).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The employer and its compensation insurer, the Utah State
Insurance Fund, argue that the Utah State Industrial Commission
acted arbitrarily and capriciously and in excess of its authority
in two respects:
1.

By awarding compensation and medical benefits to Ms. Tor-

gerson

for injuries suffered on January 20, 1982 after the

Administrative Law Judge found that the injuries on that date did
not result from an accident,
2.

By failing

to allocate 50% of the temporary total

compensation and medical benefits resulting from the July 6, 1980
accident to the Second Injury Fund in accord with the medical
panel findings adopted by the Administrative Law Judge.
ARGUMENT
PQIflT I
RICHFIELD CARE CENTER AND/OR THE UTAH STATE
INSURANCE FUND HAVE NO LIABILITY ARISING OUT
OF THE INCIDENT OF JANUARY 20 f 1982, AND THE
COMMISSION'S ORDER IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
The Administrative

Law Judge in his Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order of May 4, 1983 applied the proper
standard announced by this Court in determining that Ms. Torgerson
had not suffered a "injury by accident" during the incident of
January 20, 1982.

The standards set forth by the Legislature of

the State of Utah in determining whether or not an injury which
occurs in the course of employment is compensable is stated
specifically in Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-45 (1953) as follows:
5

Every employee • . . who is injured . . . by
accident arising out of or in the course of
his employment . , . shall be entitled to
receive . . . such compensation for loss
sustained on account of such injury . . . .
(See Attachment F for the complete language of Section 45) .

The

Administrative Law Judgefs complete findings were:
The applicant had worked at the Richfield Care
Center since July 1979 with her principal
duties being to help dress patients and
prepare them for their daily routine which
required constant lifting, supporting,
maneuvering, and dressing patients every
morning or, if on a different shift, doing
similar work preparing patients for bed.
There was nothing unusual about the activities
on the morning of January 20, 1982, nor was
there any unusual strain, twisting, fall, bump
or even an unusual movement.
In the this (sic) case there was no unusual
exertion nor anything unusual about the
activities of the applicant. There was no
unanticipated, unintended occurrence different
from what would normally be expected to occur
and there was no unforeseen or unexpected
event to precipitate the symptoms complained
of by the applicant. The movements being made
by the applicant were movements made hundreds
of time (sic) before and, at, least, as to
straightening the patients' clothes, were no
different than movements made by any ordinary
person in the process of doing everyday
activities such as dressing and undressing.
The Administrative Law Judge went on to cite Sabof s Electronic
Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 772 (Utah 1982).

Relying upon the Sabo

decision, the Administrative Law Judge found the activities of
Ms. Torgerson were similar to the activities Mr. Sabo was involved
in, both had pre-existing back problems, and the work activities
complained of required very little exertion.
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It is the position of the Utah State Insurance Fund that the
Administrative Law Judge was correct in his Findings of Fact that
Ms. Torgerson had done nothing unusual, had experienced no unusual
strain, twisting, fall, bump or unusual movement; therefore her
activities on January 20, 1982 fell directly in line with the Sabo
decision.

The incident of January 20, 1982 was not an "injury by

accident" as required by Section 45, and petitioners herein cannot
be held liable for the medical expenses, time off work or permanent impairment from that injury.
The Administrative Law Judge, in his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order dated October 3, 1984, held the State
Insurance Fund liable for compensation and medical expenses
arising out of the 1982 incident:
The Administrative Law Judge found the 1982
incident did not amount to an accident for
which benefits could be recovered in the first
order. We now find that the applicant is
entitled to benefits as a result of the 1982
incident inasmuch as it was an incident which
aggravated a previous industrial injury with
the same employer.
The Administrative Law Judge never reconsidered or overturned his
prior findings that the incident of January 20, 1982 was not an
unusual exertion, did not involve extraordinary stress, and
therefore was clearly within the Sabo guidelines.

There are no

provisions in the Utah workerfs compensation statute to hold an
employer liable for additional compensation and medical benefits
for the aggravation of an industrial injury caused by ordinary
daily activity.

The provisions of Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-45

establish the threshold which an applicant must meet in order for
7

any injury to be compensable*

That Section requires that the

injury be the result of an industrial accident: in the course
of employment.

This Court, in gileg v f industrial Cpmrojigg-Lon Q £ Utah/
P.2d

(slip op. 19711 filed October 25, 1984)

f

.

overturned the

Industrial Commission's Order denying that Mr* Giles had incurred
an industrial accident and reinstated the Administrative Law
Judge's finding that an accident had occurred, primarily because
there were no substitute findings of fact to substantiate the
Commission's Order,

In the case at bar, the Administrative Law

Judge's Order of October 3, 1984 contained no findings that an
accident had occurred in the course of employment on January 20,
1982.

The Commission's denial of plaintiff's Motion for Review

contained no additional findings of fact, but simply adopted the
Administrative Law Judge's findings.

Therefore, the only findings

in this record relating to the January 20, 1982 incident were the
findings of the Administrative Law Judge in his Order dated May 4,
1983.

He found the January 20, 1982 incident did not constitute

an unusual or unexpected stress or exertion, but was the normal
daily activity of the applicant herein.

Thus, there is no finding

of accident in the record upon which an award can be based.
This Court has long held that its standard of review on
factual matters will be:
whether the Commission's findings are "arbitrary or capricious" or "wholly without cause"
or contrary to the "one (inevitable) conclusion from the evidence" or without "any
substantial evidence" to support them. Only
8

then should
displaced.

the Commission's findings be

Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi. 631 P.2d 888f 890 (Utah 1981).
The record clearly establishes that Ms. Torgerson, at the time she
felt pain in her back on January 20, 1982, was not engaged in any
lifting, straining or unusual exertion.

Her descriptions of the

events of January 20, 1982 clearly provide sufficient evidence for
the Administrative Law Judge to make the Findings that he made on
May 4, 1983.

It is those Findings (the only findings regarding

the January 20, 1982 incident in the record) to which this Court
must apply its standard of review.
Clearly, the finding that this was not an accident in the
course of employment is not arbitrary or capricious, or v/holly
without cause; therefore this Court must uphold those findings.
By relying on this Court's decision in Sabo, the Administrative
Law Judge clearly applied the appropriate legal standard in his
Order of May 4, 1983 to the facts as he found them in determining
that no accident had occurred.

Since the employer's liability is

contingent upon an accident under the provisions of Section
35-1-45, the Order of the Commission requiring the State Insurance
Fund to pay compensation for the incident of January 20, 1982 must
not stand.
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PQIPT XI
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IMPROPERLY
ALLOCATED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TEMPORARY
TOTAL COMPENSATION AND MEDICAL BENEFITS
BETWEEN THE STATE INSURANCE FUND AND THE
SECOND INJURY FUND.
As the facts clearly set forth, the Industrial Commission was
considering applications for compensation on two distinct industrial occurrences in this case.

The first occurrence, which the

State Insurance Fund does not contest, was an industrial accident
which happened on July 6, 1980.

The medical panel found that

prior to July 6, 1980, Ms. Torgerson had a 2.5% permanent bodily
impairment due to a prior injury to her back.

The medical panel

also found that the July 6, 1980 incident increased that impairment to her back by another 2.5%.

The medical panel then went on

to consider the impairment resulting from the January 20, 1982
occurrence, which the Administrative Law Judge had already found
did not constitute an accident. The panel attributed 2.5% permanent bodily impairment to that occurrence.
The Administrative Law Judge, in making his calculations to
determine the amount of contribution the Second Injury Fund should
make, treated the 1980 and 1982 incidents as a single industrial
incident.

This Court has consistently held that the Commission

must consider separate accidents serially in order to determine
physical impairment attributable to each accident, and also the
relationship each accident bears to a person's total physical
impairment.

&&£ Jacobson Construction & Industrial Indemnity

Co. v. Hare, 667 P.2d 25 (Utah 1983); Northwest Q^xi^r&a
10

Inq,r

v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 639 P.2d 138 (Utah 1981); Second
Injury Fund v. Perry's Mill & Cabinet, 684 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1984).
In Jacobson Construction v. Hare, this Court clearly illustrated to the Commission the proper method for converting whole
man impairment to partial man impairment ratings based on a series
of events.

Mr. Hare, who had a 25% congenital impairment, later

suffered a 10% whole man impairment, and finally suffered a 50%
whole man impairment from an industrial accident.
subtracted

This Court

the 25% initial impairment from 100% whole man,

resulting in a 75% whole man for rating purposes.

Thus, when the

10% whole man impairment acted upon the 75% man, it resulted in an
8% increase of impairment, thus leaving Mr. Hare a 67% man for
rating purposes.

The Court thus held that the 50% whole man

impairment acting upon the 67% man for impairment rating purposes
resulted in a 34% increase in impairment of Mr. Hare.
This is a clear illustration of the proper allocation of
serial impairments.

In the instant case, Ms. Torgerson, following

the incident of July 6, 1980, was a 5% impaired person (determining partial person figures on such low values and then rounding
those figures off is insignificant; the easiest way to treat this
incident is to use the whole person impairment rating given by the
medical panel), 2.5% being due to pre-existing conditions and 2.5%
being due to the industrial accident of July 6, 1980.

Thus, the

proper allocation of responsibility for temporary total compensation and medical expenses is 50% to be paid by the employer and
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its insurance carrier and 50% to be paid by the Second Injury
Fund.
While it is the position of the State Insurance Fund that
this Court need not consider the impairment resulting from the
occurrence of January 20, 1982 since no accident occur red, if the
additional impairment of that date is to be considered, then the
2.5% increase in impairment

(rounded to 3%) acted upon a 95%

impaired person, the partial person figure would be rounded to 3%f
thus resulting in a total impairment to Ms. Torgerson of 8%.
In Secor^ Injury Fun^ V. Pgrry'g Mill & Cabinet, aUE£3r this Court
reaffirmed the method for determining Second Injury Fund liability.

The method is to require the Second Injury Fund to pay a

percentage of temporary total compensation and medical expense
based on the ratio pre-existing impairment bears to total impairment.

The Second Injury Fund, on the January 20, 1982 incident,

would be liable for 5/8ths of the temporary total compensation and
medical benefits, and the State Insurance Fund would be liable for
3/8ths.

Instead, by combining all of the figures, treating the

1980 and 1982 incidents as one, the Administrative Law Judge found
the State Insurance Fund liable for two-thirds of the temporary
total compensation from both incidents.

This is clear error under

this Court's previously established criteria for determining
proportional liability under Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69
(1976, as amended 1983).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the facts contained in the record, this Court should
order that because there are no findings to substantiate an
industrial accident on January 20, 1982, the State Insurance Fund
and Richfield Care Center are liable only for the impairment to
Ms. Torgerson resulting from the 1980 industrial accident.

Thus,

the State Insurance Fund would be liable for 2.5% permanent
partial impairment, and the Second Injury Fund would be liable for
2.5% permanent partial impairment.

The temporary total compensa-

tion and medical benefits are then properly allocated 50% to the
Second Injury Fund and 50% to the Utah State Insurance Fund.
DATED this

^ T T a y of March, 1985.
BLACK & MOORE

Fred R. Silvest'er
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed 4 true and exact copies of the
foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, this

Q -•-.,._ day of March, 1985,

to the following:
Michael J. Labrum
10 8 North Main
Richfield, UT 84701

Gilbert A. Martinez
Second Injury Fund
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Stephen Schwendiman
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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LYD1A J. TORGERSON,

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Applicant,
vs.
RICHFIELD CARE CENTER,
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
and SECOND INJURY FUND,

*
*
*
*

Defendants.

"••'•-•-•E33

i^Fy
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room, Utah Industrial Commission, 160 East
300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 25, 1983,
at 10:00 o'clock a.m. Said hearing was pursuant to
Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Keith E. Sohm, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented by Michael
R. Labrum, Attorney at Law.
The defendants Richfield Care
Insurance Fund were represented
Attorney at Law.

Center and State
by Fred Silvester,

The Second Injury Fund was represented by Gilbert A.
Martinez, Administrator.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
During the course of her employment with the defendant company on or
about July 6, 1980 the applicant was trying to place a patient in a chair and
fell striking first the wall and then hitting the floor. She suffered pain in
the low back area which was medically treated apparently in a hospital. Three
days later, surgery was performed for a hysterectomy and to repair a ruptured
bladder. The applicant maintained it was the ruptured bladder that hurt rather than an injury back. The applicant indicated that she had no further pain
in her back or treatment for her back. However, a letter from Dr. Henrie, an
orthopedic physician, indicates that he examined her at the Richfield Hospital
on July 10, 1980:

LYDIA J . TOFGEfcSON
ORDER
PAGE TWO

"in regards to her complaints of low back pain which she dates to an
accident occurring while at work for the Richfield Care Center on July
6, 1980."
The doctor reported that on July 11 the patient was still having:
"aching through the low back area, difficulty moving or turning and
had some difficulty in getting to an erect posture because of pain and
discomfort.11
The applicant further admitted on cross-examination that she wore a
back brace continuously from July 1980 until January 1983 to protect her back,
but denied any back problems during that period. The 1980 incident was clearly an industrial accident, but no claim is made by the applicant for that incident. The only event for which a claim is being made is for an incident
that occurred on January 20, 1982. In the written application the applicant
described the incident as:
"Getting a patient up for daily routine, lifted patient with right arm
and reached to straighten up his clothes around shoulder."
At the hearing, the applicant further described the patient as a man
weighing about 190 pounds who was lying down on a bed. Mrs. Torgerson had
raised the patient to a sitting position, was supporting him with the hand,
reached to pull a T-shirt over his head when she felt a pain in her lower
back. The pain was severe, making it difficult to straighten up. She immediately reported the incident to the office and was told to fill out an accident report and go home. She drove herself home and was taken to a clinic
by her daughter. She was examined by Dr. Smoot, given some medication, with
bed rest and physical therapy recommended. Applicant returned to work on
March 3, 1982 and was still having some back aches and some pain down the left
leg, but worked 2 1/2 months until the condition became more severe. The applicant changed to Dr. Jackson who examined her on June 29, 1982 and recommended traction at the hospital and when conservative treatment did not help a
CAT scan was taken at the University of Utah Hospital which was followed by
surgery in September 1982. The applicant was released from the hospital on
September 23, 1983 with an excellent result. Mrs. Torgerson was released to
return to work in January of 1983 with a 5% permanent partial impairment rating.
The applicant had worked at the Richfield Care Center since July 1979
with her principal duties being to help dress patients and prepare them for
their daily routine which required constant lifting, supporting, manuvering,
and dressing patients every morning or, if on a different shift, doing similar

LYD1A J. TORGKRSON
ORDER
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work preparing patients for bed. There was nothing unusual about the activities on the morning of January 20, 1982 nor was there any unusual strain,
twisting, fall, bump or even an unusual movement.
In the this case there was no unusual exertion nor anything unusual
about the activities of the applicant. There was no unanticipated, unintended
occurrence different from what would normally be expected to occur and there
was no unforeseen or unexpected events to precipitate the symptoms complained
of by the applicant. The movements being made by the applicant were movements
made hundred of times before and ,at least, as to straightening the patient's
clothes, were no different than movements made by any ordinary person in the
process of doing everyday activities such as dressing and undressing.
The case is directly in point with the recent decision of the Utah
Supreme Court in Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722, decided
February 19, 1982. The Court held in the Sabo case that when Sabo suffered a
pain in his back reaching down to lift a box of clock radios the incident
could not be held to be an accident even though the results were immediate.
The Administrativbe Law Judge at first denied benefits in the Sabo case followed by the Commission's Order to remand to a medical panel. The medical
panel found a relationship between the applicant's employment activities and
the subsequent medical complications. A subsequent Order by the Commission
finding an accident occurred was reversed by the Supreme Court with a finding
of "no accident". There is a further similarity in that the applicant in both
cases had a pre-existing back problem and the activities involved required
very little exertion.
In light of the statutory definition, the law and recent cases from the
Supreme Court, the Administrative Law Judge finds that no industrial accident
occurred in this case and therefore that the applicant is not entitled to
workmen's compensation benefits.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Application should be denied.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Application be, and the same is hereby,
denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall
be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof specifying in
detail the particular errors and objections and unless so filed this Order
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

LYD1A J. TORGKRSON
ORDER
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Keith E. Sohm
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, .Salt Lake City,,^ Utah this
*?<*j^

day

of

"*"/ / '• >'' •

1933.

i
Linda Strasburg
Commission Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that^ on
sYX^^
, 1983 a copy of the
attached
L^-^JL^^
was mailed to the following persons at
the following addresses, postage paid:

Lydia J. Torgerson, 595 South 800 West, Richfield, UT
84701
Michael R. Labrurn, Atty., 108 North Main, Richfield, UT
84701
Richfield Care Center, 1000 North Main, Richfield, UT
84701
State Insurance Fund, 560 South 300 East, SLC, UT

84111

Fred Silvester, Atty., Suie 500, Ten W Broadway, SLC, UT
84101
Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrator, Second Injury Fund

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By

Har^e

ATTACHMENT B

1NDUSTR1 U . COMMISSION OF UTAH
S C O T ! M M A U I L S O N , CJONLRNOR

W A L T I R T AXLLC.NRD. CHMRMW
SI I PHI N M HADLl >. COMMISSION! U
MILTON E SAATHOf f, c OMMISMOM R

February 21, 1984
Michael R. Labrura, Esquire
Labrura & Taylor
Attorneys at Law
108 North Main
Richfield, Utah 84701
Fred Silvester, Esquire
Black & Moore
Attorneys at Law
261 East 300 South
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Re:
Inj:
Emp:

Lydia Torgerson
01-20-82
Richfield Care Center

Gentlemen:
The State Insurance Fund, through its counsel Bruce Wilson, declined to
enter into an agreement for compensating the Applicant, Mr. Wilson took the
position that further consideration of the 1980 injury was barred by the three
year Statute of Limitations.
The Hearing was held before the three year Statute of Limitation expired.
I am considering the disclosures at the Hearing together with the medical
reports making reference to the 1980 incident as sufficient notice to the
Commission to satisfy the requirements of Section 35-1-99 and therefore rule
that claims based on the 1980 incident are not barred by the Statute of
Limitations.
The Applicant is instructed to file an Application for the 1980 incident
and the matter will be referred to a Medical Panel for its evaluation of claims
associated with that incident. I still suggest the parties settle the matter
and a compromise on five percent or an agreed lesser figure may be in the best
interests of all parties.
BY DIRECTION:
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Keith E. Sohm
Administrative Law Judge
KES:dmh
cc: Lydia J. Torgerson, 595 South 800 West, Richfield, UT 84701
State Insurance Fund, Attn: Bruce Wilson, Attorney at Law
Second Injury Fund, Attn: Gilbert Martinez, Administrator
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An Order was entered in this case denying benefits to the Applicant
based on the 1982 incident. The Order acknowledged that the Applicant may
have been involved in an accident during the course of her employment with
Defendant Company on July 6, 1980 but no Application had been filed for that
incident. The Applicant, by and through her attorney, filed a Motion for
Reviex<7 requesting the Law Judge take official notice of the July 6, 1980
incident and refer the matter to the Medical Panel to evaluate that industrial
injury along with the January 20, 1982 incident.
The Defendants contended, in response to that Motion, that the 1980
incident was barred by the three year Statute of Limitations in Section
35-1-99. The Administrative Law Judge finds that the Hearing was held in
this case April 25,' 1983 and at the Hearing there was a sufficient disclosure
regarding the July 1980 industrial injury together with with medical reports
to be considered notice to the Commission sufficient to meet the tests of
Section 35-1-99 and that those disclosures, of course, were provided the
Commission in less than three years.
The Administrative Law Judge finds that the Motion to reopen and
refer the matter to a Medical Panel is well taken.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAU:
The Order of May 4, 1983 should be set aside and the matter
reopened and referred to a Mcdica] Panel for evaluation allowing the Medical
Panel to evaluate' the affects of the July 1980 accident along with the
January 20, 1982 incident.

ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law
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dated May 4, 1983 be, and is hereby, set aside, that the Applicant file an
Application involving the July 6, 1980 incident and that the matter be
referred to a Medical Panel for evaluation in connection with both the 1980
and 1982 incidents.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

4 1 ^
Keith E. Sohm
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission of
Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
2-/

ATTF.H :

/«/

Linda J, Strasburr

Lind;: J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary
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was mailed to the following persons a t t h e

following

a d d r e s s e s , postage p a i d :
Lydia J . Torgerson
595 South 800 West
R i c h f i e l d , Utah 84701
R i c h f i e l d Care Center
1000 North Main
R i c h f i e l d , Utah 84 701
Fred S i l v e s t e r , E s q u i r e
Black & Moore
Attorneys at Law
261 East 300 South
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Michael R. Labrum
Attorney at Law
108 North Main
Richfield, Utah 84701
State Insurance Fund
560 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Gilbert A. Martinez
Administrator
Second Injury Fund
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 83000039

LYDIA J. TORGERSON,
Applicant,
vs.
RICHFIELD CARE CENTER,
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
and SECOND INJURY FUND,
Defendants.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 25,
1983
at 10:00 A.M. O'clock.
Said Hearing was
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Keith E. Sohm, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Michael
R. Labrum, Attorney at Law.
The Defendants were represented by Fred Silvester,
Attorney at Law.
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Gilbert A.
Martinez, Administrative Law Judge.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
The original Application was filed to consider an incident which
occurred January 20, 1982. No claim was made for a 1980 incident.
After
considering all the facts the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order May 4,
1983 denying the Application as to the January 20, 1982 incident inasmuch as
the facts in connection with that incident did not constitute an accident.
All of the facts in the case are set forth in detail in that report.
Thereafter, the Applicant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and an
Application for benefits pursuant to the 1980 injury and an Application for
Relief in connection with the 1980 injury was also provided by the Applicant.
The Defendants objected to the reopening and claimed a Three Year Statute of
Limitations barred the Applicant from further consideration in that matter.
An Order was issued by the Administrative Law Judge reopening the case and
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setting aside the Order of May 4, 1983 and referring to a Medical Panel for
evaluation as to the effects of the July 1980 accident along with the January
20, 1982 incident.
The Applicant began work with the Defendant Company July 1979 with
her principal duties being to help dress patients and prepare them for their
daily
routine which required
the Applicant
to be constantly
lifting,
supporting, manuvering, and dressing patients every morning or preparing the
patients for bed.
During the course of her employment with the Defendant
Company on or about July 6, 1980 the Applicant was trying to place a patient
in a chair and fell striking first the wall and then hitting the floor. She
suffered pain in the low back area which was medically treated apparently in
the Hospital. Three days later surgery was performed for a hysterectomy and
to repair a ruptured bladder. The Applicant thought that it was the ruptured
bladder that hurt rather than the injured back. The Applicant indicated that
she had no further pain in her back or treatment for her back, however, a
letter from Dr. Henry, an Orthopedic Physician indicates that he examined her
at the Richfield Hospital on July 10, 1980 in regards to low back pains. The
Applicant
indicated
on
cross-examination
that
she wore
a back brace
continually from July 1980 until January 1983.
The medical aspects of the case were referred to a Medical Panel for
evaluation.
The Medical Panel returned its Report copies of which were
circulated to all of the parties as was a Supplemental Report. There being no
Objection to the Medical Panel Reports the same are received in evidence, the
Findings therein adopted by the Administrative Law Judge as his own which are
as follows:
There is no medically-demonstrable causal connection between the
problems in her bladder and uterus and the industrial accident.
Based upon the review of medical records, these conditions are the
normal conditions found in a woman of middle age who has had
several pregnancies.
As far as the herniated disk at L4-5 is concerned, it is the
opinion of the Panel that this is related to the industrial
accident. It is our opinion that this began with the injury of
1978, was aggravated by the injury of 1980, and was further
aggravated and required surgery following the injury of 1982,
2. The periods of time during which the applicant was temporarily
totally disabled as a result of the industrial injury were from
January 20, 1982, to March 3rd, 1982, and from June 29th, 1982,
until she returned to work in January of 1983.
3. The applicant's total physical impairment is related to the
disk herniation and her low back problem. We note that Doctor
Jackson gives her a permanent partial impairment of 5 per cent of
the whole body. The Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
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Impairment of the American Medical Association state that a
surgically-operated disk with no residuals rates as a 5 per cent
impairment of the whole body. The Recommendations of the Academy
of Orthopedic Surgeons states that a surgically-operated disk
rates as a 10 per cent impairment of the whole body.
We note that Doctor Jackson, the treating physician, rates her as a
5 per cent impairment of the whole body. This would be consistent
with the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment of the
American Medical Association in that she has had an operated disk
&nd, based upon all examinations, she has no residuals. She does
not complain of pain, there is no motor weakness or atrophy, and
physical examination shows no significant neurological defect.
Because of the discrepancy between the two rating systems, it
is the opinion of the panel that we should average the two and
rate her permanent partial impairment as 7fit1/2 percent of the
whole body.
A. The percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable
to the accident of July 6th, 1980, is 2 & 1/2 per cent of the whole
body. The permanent impairment related to the accident of
January 20th, 1982 is 2 & 1/2 per cent of the whole body.
5. The percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable
to conditions prior to July 6th, 1980, is 2 & 1/2 per cent of the
whole body.
6. It is our opinion that the injuries of 1980 and 1982 did medically
aggravate the pre-existing impaired condition of the Applicant.
7. The hysterectomy done in 1980 was not required as a result of the
industrial accident. The treatment by Doctor Smoot in 1982 and the
surgery done by Doctor Jackson on her low back in 1982 were required
as a result of the industrial injury.
8. It is the opinion of the panel that Ms. Torgerson will require
no further treatment including surgery or medication as a result of
the industrial injury.
The Law Judge finds that there was no causal connection between the
bladder and uterus problems and the industrial accidents but that there was a
causal connection between the herniated disk and the industrial accidents with
the problem beginning with an injury of 1978 aggravated by the injury of 1980
and further aggravated and requiring surgery following the injury of 1982.
The Applicant

was

temporarily

totally

disabled

as

a result

of

the
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industrial injuries from January 20, 1982 to March 3, 1982 and from June 29,
1982 until January 1983.
The Applicant sustained an overall permanent partial impairment
rating of 7 & 1/2 per cent of the whole body with 2 & 1/2 per cent assigned to
the July 1980 incident and 2 & 1/2 per cent assigned to the January 20, 1982
incident and 2 & 1/2 per cent assigned to the conditions prior to the 1980
incident. The Panel found that the Applicant should not require further
treatment or surgery as the result of the industrial injury.
The Applicant was earning $3.80 an hour working 40 hours a week and
though she was divorced was responsible for the support of five minor children
resulting in a weekly entitlement of $126.32 a week.
Though the Administrative Law Judge found the 1982 incident did not
amount to an accident for which benefits could be recovered in the first Order
we now find that the Applicant is entitled to benefits as a result of the 1982
incident inasmuch as it was an incident which aggravated a previous industrial
injury with the same employer. The Applicant is entitled to temporary total
disability compensation for the periods of time indicated above totalling 33
weeks which when multiplied times $126.32 would equal $4,168.56 less $702.85
already paid by the Defendant State Insurance Fund for a resultant figure of
$3,466.00 to be paid by the State Insurance Fund. The Applicant is further
entitled to benefits based on 5 per cent or 15.6 weeks which when multiplied
times $126.32 would equal $1,971.00 to be paid by the State Insurance Fund and
2 & 1/2 per cent or 7.8 weeks times $126.32 which would equal $985.00 to be
paid by the Second Injury Fund.
We note that the Defendant Insurance Carrier has paid medical costs
in the amount of $1,362.48. The Defendant employer and the State Insurance
Fund are entitled to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for payments of
temporary total disability and medical expenses based on ratio of 2 & 1/2 over
7 & 1/2 or 33 per cent.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Defendant should pay the Applicant the sums set forth above.

ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant employer and Insurance
Carrier
pay
the Applicant
$3,466.00
for temporary
total disability
compensation and $1,971.00 for permanent partial impairment benefits.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to pay the Applicant compensation at the
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rate of $126.32 for 7.6 weeks foe a total of $985.00 as compensation for a 2 &
1/2 per cent pre-existing permanent physical impairment which sum is to be
paid in a lump sum and to reimburse the State Insurance Fund to the extent of
33 per cent of the amounts expended herein for temporary total disability and
medical expenses upon the filing of a duly Verified Petition certifying the
amounts thus expended.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants pay all medical expenses
incurred as the result of this accident in accordance with the Medical and
Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael Labrum, Attorney for the
Applicant, be paid the sum of $1,284.40, the same to be deducted from the
aforesaid award.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Keith E. Sohm
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission of ,
Utah, Salt J,ake City, Utah, this .Holiday of
/Vr^VVV
, 1984.
ATTEST:

'c'^/ff/.XsTcf&r
''Linda J. Strasburg
Commission -Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on ([/%<,nf)srA
l*?
, 1934 a copy of
the attached FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER was mailed to the
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:
Lydia J. Torgerson
595 South 800 West
Richfield, Utah 8A701
Michael R. Labrum
Attorney at Law
108 North Main
Richfield, Utah 84701
Richfield Care Center
1000 North Main
Richfield, Utah 84701

State Insurance Fund
560 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Fred Silvester
Attorney at Law
Suite 500
Ten West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Gilbert A. Martinez
Administrator
Second Injury Fund
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ATTACHMENT D

Fred R. Silvester
BLACK & MOORE
261 East Broadway, Suite 300
Salt Lake Cityf UT 84111
Telephone: 363-2727
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No, 83000039
LYDIA J. TORGERSON,
Applicant,
MOTION FOR REVIEW

-vRICHFIELD CARE CENTER, STATE
INSURANCE FUND, and SECOND
INJURY FUND,
Defendants.

Richfield Care Center and the Utah State Insurance Fund, by
and through counsel of record, hereby submit the following Motion
for Review in the above entitled action.
POINT I
THE COMMISSION SHOULD REINSTATE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF MAY 4 , 1983
DECLARING THE INCIDENT ON JANUARY 2 0 , 1982 AS
NOT CONSTITUTING AN INJURY BY ACCIDENT UNDER
UTAH LAW,
The F i n d i n g s of F a c t of t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law J u d g e
The a p p l i c a n t had worked a t t h e R i c h f i e l d C a r e
C e n t e r s i n c e J u l y of 1979 w i t h h e r p r i n c i p a l
d u t i e s b e i n g t o h e l p d r e s s p a t i e n t s and
p r e p a r e them f o r t h e i r d a i l y r o u t i n e , which
required
constant lifting,
supporting,
m a n e u v e r i n g , and d r e s s i n g p a t i e n t s every
m o r n i n g o r , i f on a d i f f e r e n t s h i f t , d o i n g
s i m i l a r work p r e p a r i n g p a t i e n t s for bed.
T h e r e was n o t h i n g u n u s u a l a b o u t t h e a c t i v i t i e s
on t h e m o r n i n g o f J a n u a r y 2 0 , 1982 n o r was

state:

there any unusual strain, twisting, fallf
bump, or even an unusual movement.
In the this (sic) case there was no unusual
exertion nor anything unusual about the
activities of the applicant. There was no
unanticipated, unintended occurrence different
from what would normally be expected to occur,
and there was no unforeseen or unexpected
event to precipitate the symptoms complained
of by the applicant. The movements being made
by the applicant were movements made hundreds
of times before and, at least, as to the
straightening of patients1 clothes, were no
different from movements made by any ordinary
person in the process of doing everyday
activities such as dressing and undressing.
It is the position of the Utah State Insurance Fund that this is
an accurate statement reflecting the testimony of the applicant at
hearing.

As the Administrative Law Judge accurately pointed out

in his first Order, the Findings are directly in point with Sabo
and do not constitute an injury by accident.
The Administrative Law Judge did not reverse these Findings
in his Order of October 3, 1984; but, rather, found the applicant
entitled to benefits by finding that this was an aggravation of a
previous industrial injury with the same employer.

The provisions

of Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69 in no way modify the provisions
of Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-42 which require that in order for
an applicant to be entitled to compensation, the applicant must
suffer an injury by accident in the course of employment.
The facts here are clearly analogous to the Donald Glen Mason
case, in which Mr. Mason, having pre-existing back difficulties,
lifted 100-pound bags of whey, and at least on two occasions felt
pain in his back.

In Mason the Supreme Court clearly found

2

that since an accident did not occur in the course of employment,
Mr. Mason was not entitled to compensation.
Based on this law, the Administrative Law Judgefs Findings
of Fact and his May 1983 Order constitute the proper findings in
this case, and the Utah State Insurance Fund respectfully requests
the Commission to reverse the award of compensation based on the
non-accidental occurrence of January 20, 1982.

POINT II
EVEN IF THE 1982 INCIDENT CONSTITUTED AN
INJURY BY ACCIDENT, THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE SHOULD ADJUST HIS CALCULATIONS REGARDING
THE RATE OF COMPENSATION WHICH THE APPLICANT
IS ENTITLED TO AND THE AMOUNT OF REIMBURSEMENT
DUE FROM THE SECOND INJURY FUND.
The medical panel appointed by the Administrative Law Judge
found, and the Administrative Law Judge agreed, that the applicant
sustained an overall permanent partial impairment of 7.5% of the
whole body.

The medical panel allocated this by indicating that

2.5% of that impairment pre-existed the incident of July of 1980,
2.5% was caused by the incident of July of 1980, and 2.5% was
caused by the incident of January 20, 1982.

The Administrative

Law Judge found that the applicant was earning $3.80 per hour for
a 40-hour week, but failed to review the record to determine that
that was the rate of pay for the 1982 occurrence.

There is

nothing in the record regarding the applicant's rate of pay during
1980; therefore it is improper to calculate the entire compensation rate based on the 1982 rate.
Further, since this is an application for compensation for
two industrial incidents, because the Administrative Law Judge
3

allowed for amendment of the application to claim two incidents
(one in 1980 and one in 1982), those incidents must be calculated
separately.

Therefore, if in fact the applicant suffered an

increase in impairment from 2.5% which was not attributable to
industrial causes to 5% as a result of the 1980 incident, the Utah
State Insurance Fund, having paid temporary total compensation and
medical benefits on that incident, would be entitled to a 50%
reimbursement for all temporary total compensation and medical
benefits attributable to the 1980 incident.
In addition, if the 1982 incident is determined to be an
accident, clearly the State Insurance Fund would be liable for the
permanent partial impairment attributable to that incident; but,
having satisfied its temporary total and medical expense obligation on the 1980 incident, the 2.5% attributable to pre-existing
conditions and the 2.5% permanent impairment attributable to the
1980 incident would be pre-existing conditions, pursuant to
Section 69; therefore the State Insurance Fund would be entitled
to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for two-thirds of the
medicals and temporary total compensation on the 1982 incident
since the combined disabilities of the 1982 incident show 2.5%
permanent partial impairment attributable to the 1982 incident and
5% permanent partial impairment pre-existing the 1982 incident.
Therefore, even if the Commission were to find that the 1982
incident was an injury by accident, it is respectfully requested
that the 1980 and 1982 incidents be treated as separate applications, which they are, and the calculations made separately on
4

each entitling the Utah State Insurance Fund to 50% reimbursement
for temporary total compensation and medical benefits paid on the
1982 incident, and entitling the State Insurance Fund to a
two-thirds reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for medical
benefits and temporary total compensation to be paid on the 1982
incident*

It could be argued further that failure of the appli-

cant to prove all the elements necessary for compensation, namely
her wage rate, on the 1980 incident should preclude recovery on
that incident,
DATED this UBLtJl day of October, 1984.
BLACK & MOORE

Fred R, Silvester

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the
foregoing Motion for Review, postage prepaid, this HLfcJbi day of
October, 1984, to the following:
Gilbert A, Martinez
Second Injury Fund
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Michael J* Labrum
108 North Main
Richfield, UT 84701

State Insurance Fund
560 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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DENIAL OF

Applicant,

MOTION FOR REVIEW

vs.
RICHFIELD CARE CENTER and/or
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
and SECOND INJURY FUND,
Defendants.

*
*
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On or about October 3, 1984, an Order was entered by an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in the above
entitled case.
On or about October 19, 1984, the Commission received a Motion for
Review from the Defendants by and through their attorney.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the Administrative Law Judge affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law
Judge dated October 3, 1984, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and
the Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah,, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
_day of December, 1984.

Walter T. Axelgard

T* l M'

/If Plfi

Stephen M. Hadley
Commissioner
Commission Secretary
Lenice L. Nielsen
Commissioner

#

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on December^
_, 1984 a copy of the
attached Denial of Motion for Review was mailed to the following persons at
the following addresses, postage paid:

Lydia J. Torgerson, 595 South 800 Vest, Richfield, UT 84701
Michael R. Labrum, Atty., 108 North Main, Richfield, UT 84701
State Insurance Fund, 560 South 300 East, SLC, UT 84111
Fred Silvester, Atty., 261 East 300 South, #300, SLC, UT 84111
Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrator, Second Injury Fun
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35-1-45

LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

per month" at the end of subd. (4); and made
minor changes in phraseology.

Loaned employee.
Where employee of trucking company was
assigned by the company to haul a load of
wood paneling for the defendant and directed
by the company to assist defendant's employees in loading the truck, for purposes of this
act the truck driver became defendant's
employee during the loading process, and
when he was injured in the course of it, his
remedy against defendant was limited to the
collection of workmen's compensation benefits. Bambrough v. Bethers (1976) 552 P 2d
1286.

Business of employer.
Owner of ten parcels of real property on
which were 19 rental units which owner
actively managed was in the rental business,
and employee he hired to paint and repair
units for forty hours a month was not within
the exclusion of subd. (2) of this section.
Sorenson v. Industrial Comm. (1979) 59S P 2d
362.
35-1-45.

Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.

Accident.
Death of employee who had a preexisting
heart weakness was the result of an "accident" arising out of and in the course of
employment where death by heart attack
occurred while working on the job, and
because of a mechanical defect in the truck
the employee was operating he was required[
to repeatedly hoist himself up into the cab,
requiring a greater exertion than would have;
been required had the truck been working;
properly. Nuzum v. Roosendahl Constr. &:
Mining Corp. (1977) 565 P 2d 1144.
An internal failure brought about by exertion in the course of employment may be anL
accident without the requirement that theJ
injury result from some incident which happened suddenly and is identifiable at a definite time and place; however, there must be ai
causal connection between the injury and thei
employment. Schmidt v. Industrial Comm. of
Utah (1980) 617 P 2d 693.
Accident is an unanticipated, unintended
occurrence different from what would normally be expected to occur in the usual1
course of events; thus, if an employee incurs3
unexpected injuries, including internal failures caused by the duties of his employmentt
he is eligible for compensation under thiss
section. Painter Motor Co. v.Ostler (1980) 6171
P 2d 975.
Evidence that employee experienced ai
"catch" in his back while shoveling rock ini
the course of his employment was sufficient,,
in light of his history of work-related backi
injuries and medical condition, to establishI
that such shoveling incident could have2
added to or aggravated a job-induced preexisting back condition and that the injury andi
disability caused by the incident resultedI
from an accident. Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
Monfredi (1981) 631 P 2d 888.
Claimant failed to prove that back injury/
received while engaged in his employmentt
was the result of an accident where theree

was no evidence that showed anything
unusual about his activities on the day of the
injury or any unusual exertion or strain or
contact with objects or a fall. Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo (1982) 642 P 2d 722.
Aggravation or acceleration of injury or
disease.
Compensation was denied a truck driver
who underwent surgery following two 1975
incidents of back discomfort on the job,
which aggravated driver's scoliosis of the
spine and spondylolysis, both of which conditions developed after a trucking accident suffered in 1972, since the type of work he was
engaged in at the time of the 1975 incidents
was not unusual or unexpected and the
aggravation of his physical condition gradually developed without the intervention of
any external occurrence or trauma. Farmers
Grain Cooperative v. Mason (1980) 606 P 2d
237.
Arising out of or in course of employment.
Where the evidence affirmatively shows
that the assigned duties of a traveling salesman include keeping his car in a safe and
efficient running condition, there is a reasonable basis to support the commission's findings that injury to him while he was working
on his car arose within the scope of his
employment. Hafer's, Inc. v. Industrial
Comm. of Utah (1974) 526 P 2d 1188.
Claimant was not entitled to compensation
as a result of an automobile accident at the
end of a claimed business and pleasure trip,
where the trip was primarily to visit a personal friend and former employer of the
claimant and the business end of the trip
could have been accomplished in the claimant's office. Martinson v. W-M Insurance
Agency, Inc. (1980) 606 P 2d 256.
A truck driver whose practice was to take
home a tractor to clean and service it with
the knowledge of his employers was acting in
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the course of his employment when he was
killed in an accident on his way home from
his place of employment. Kinne v. Industrial
Comm. (1980) 609 P 2d 926.
Conduct of employee in running to investigate and to offer help when it appeared that
a fellow emplovee might he in danger or dis.
. ,
,
i,
tress was a natural and reasonably
expectable reaction so that his subsequent
death from heart attack was an accident
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Burden of proof.

Medical services.
Import of this section is that medicals are
something additional to and separate from
the compensation. Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Industrial Comm. (1979) 597 P 2d 875.
Self-inflicted injuries,
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35-1-46. Employers to s e c u r e compensation — Ways allowed — F a i l u r e —
Notice — I n j u n c t i o n — Violation — P e n a l t y . Employers including counties,
cities, towns and school districts shall secure compensation to their employees in
one of the following ways: (1) By insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of
such compensation with the state insurance fund, which payments shall commence
within 90 days of any final award of the commission.
(2) By insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of such compensation with
any stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of
workmen's compensation insurance in this state, which payments shall commence
within 90 days of any final award by the commission.
(3) By furnishing annually to the commission satisfactory proof of financial
ability to pay direct compensation in the amount, in the manner and when due
as provided for in this title, which payments shall commence within 90 days of
any final award by the commission. In such cases the commission may in its discretion require the deposit of acceptable security, indemnity or bond to secure the payment of compensation liabilities as they are incurred, and may at any time change
or modify its findings of fact herein provided for, if in its judgment such action
is necessary or desirable to secure or assure a strict compliance with all the provisions of law relating to the payment of compensation and the furnishing of medical,
nurse and hospital services, medicines and burial expenses to injured, and to the
dependents of killed employees. The commission may in proper cases revoke any
employer's privilege as a self-insurer.
The commission is hereby authorized and empowered to maintain a suit in any
court of the state to enjoin any employer, within the provisions of this act, from
further operation of the employer's business, where the employer has failed to
insure or to keep insured in one of the three ways in this section provided, the
payment of compensation to injured employees, and upon a showing of such failure
to insure the court shall enjoin the further operation of such business until such
time as such insurance has been obtained by the employer. The court may enjoin
the employer without requiring bond from the commission.
If the commission has reason to believe that an employer of one or more employees is conducting a business without securing the payment of compensation in one
of the three ways provided in this section, the commission may give such employer
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